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NOTES
VOTING RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
IN CHAPTER X REORGANIZATIONS
Circumstances sometimes make reorganization the preferable course
for a corporation whose earnings are insufficient to improve its poor finan-
cial condition.' While continued operation under the present capital struc-
ture, coupled with deferral or reduction of expenditures not immediately
essential, may be justified where increased earnings are in sight, prolonga-
tion of the status quo may be impractical if the future holds little hope for
improvement of the firm's financial position or if the corporation is in-
solvent in the bankruptcy sense. Liquidation will forestall losses and free
the assets of creditors and stockholders for more favorable investment, but,
especially in a depressed market, forced sales may produce losses as severe
as would result from continued operation. Not only may the creditors and
stockholders suffer, the public may also be injured by withdrawal from the
economy of a business unit which, but for past financial difficulties, could
be profitably operated. If the corporation's difficulties may be corrected by
a reorganization of the capital structure, the losses incident to liquidation
may be avoided.2 A reorganization may reduce fixed charges which are
presently beyond the absorptive capacity of company income, or provide
extension of time for payment of maturing debts which exceed existing
liquid assets, or compromise creditors' claims where past losses have caused
insolvency but future operations may be sufficiently profitable to permit dis-
charge of the readjusted obligations and to improve the firm's position.
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act s provides a statutory course of action
for effecting recapitalization of corporations which can thereby be profitably
operated as going concerns.
Although the current period of economic prosperity has occasioned
a marked decline in the number and dollar volume of reorganization pro-
ceedings, 4 it seems advisable at this juncture to re-examine the adequacy of
1. See 6 COLLIR, BANKRUPTCY § 0.01 (14th ed. 1947) (hereinafter cited as COL-
LMR); Swaine, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization: An Affirmative
View, 19 A.B.A.J. 698 (1933).
2. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 124 (1939).
3. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952) (Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-
276).
4. See Securities and Exchange Commission annual reports, Nos. 5 through 20.
For those reorganization proceedings in which the SEC participated, beginning in fiscal
year ended June 30, 1939, the first year that chapter X became effective, there were 87
new proceedings involving 105 corporations having assets aggregating in excess of
$550,000,000 and liabilities in excess of $440,000,000. 5 SEC ANN. R. 9 (1939). Dur-
ing fiscal year ended June 30, 1940, there were 47 new proceedings involving the reor-
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the machinery created to effectuate reorganizations. This Note will deal
with those provisions of the act which specify the circumstances in which
persons having interests in a debtor corporation can, by a vote, voice their
reaction to a proposed reorganization plan.
THE BASIS OF VOTING RIGHTS
Prior to the enactment of reorganization statutes, the courts had at-
tempted to afford corporations the opportunity for rehabilitation through
equity receiverships.5 These attempts proved inadequate, however, prin-
cipally because there existed no judicial power to bind dissenters to a
plan obliging them to continue in the enterprise.0 The alternative of
otherwise satisfying dissenting claims would often render impractical the
proposal to continue operation of the firm. Section 12 of the Bankruptcy
Act 7 did authorize binding of dissenters by voluntary compositions, but
it provided no means of dealing with either secured claims or the rights
of stockholders, and hence had but limited applications to incorporated
debtors.8 Combining the workable aspects of each of these otherwise in-
effectual approaches, Congress enacted section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act,9 which was made specifically applicable to corporations and provided
that acceptance by a designated plurality of each class of claimants would
bind dissenters within that class. These provisions were later re-enacted
as part of the present chapter X.
Conflicting Interests and the Vote
Presumably reorganization will be undertaken only when it is believed
that the debtor corporation can be rehabilitated into a profitable enterprise
if freed of its burdensome capital structure. A necessary concomitant is
that some contract rights existing prior to reorganization will be changed.
For example, the interest rate on bonded indebtedness or the dividend rate
on preferred stock may be reduced; a creditor's claim may be converted
into an equity interest; security previously available to a participant may
be reduced or removed entirely. In addition, it would not be unusual for
ganization of 63 corporations having assets aggregating in excess of $1,580,000,000 and
indebtedness of $860,000,000. 6 SEC ANN. RP'. 52 (1940). These figures declined by
fiscal year ended June 30, 1956, to six new proceedings involving corporations whose
assets were in excess of $15,500,000 and liabilities in excess of $16,800,000. 22 SEC
ANN. REP. 172-73 (1956).
5. See 6 COLLIER § 0.04; FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
1-21 (1937) ; 1 GRDms, CoRPoRATz RErORGANIZATIONS §§ 10-13 (1936).
6. See 1 id. § 17. For succinct listing of other deficiencies of equity receiverships,
see Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORN=LI L.Q. 537,
540 (1941).
7. Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 12, 30 STAT. 549, now included as chapter XI of
the National Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1952).
8. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORE, AcrrVIEs,
PERSONNEL AND FuNcTIoNs OP PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTMS p.
VIII, at 72-74 (1940) (hereinafter cited as SEC STUDY).
9. Act of June 7, 1934, c. 424, § 77B, 48 STAT. 911.
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the face value of a creditor's claim or a shareholder's interest to be reduced
or eliminated. Furthermore, the eventual capital structure and the changes
wrought to achieve it in any given case will reflect the views of those
charged with the responsibility of formulating the plan of reorganization.
Since each plan is the product of varied judgments on which reasonable
men may differ, it is unlikely in any instance that only one plan will be
feasible and fair. As a result, it is to be expected that some participants will
be disgruntled by the treatment accorded them under the plan. Some
may prefer to maintain their status quo ante or to be paid for their claims
and end their association with the enterprise. Others may be willing to
have their interests altered, but disagree with the particular treatment ac-
corded them or with the likelihood of the debtor's success under the pro-
posed capital structure. Because a participant's interest can be substan-
tially affected and there are reasonable alternatives as to the best plan of
reorganization, it is essential that a means be afforded for expression of
dissatisfaction with the proposed plan.
One forum in which a participant may air his grievance is before the
court charged with approving the proposed plan. Chapter X provides for
a judicial hearing after notice at which all those concerned with the debtor
may present their views. 10 The judge may then approve or disapprove
the plan, with or without modification." The plan may be approved if, in
the judgment of the court, it is the best method of reorganizing the debtor
corporation. If primary consideration is given to the public's interest in
effectuating reorganizations, a participant's opportunity to express his
views might be limited to his day in court. However, it' seems desirable to
give greater weight to the interests of participants than to that of the
public. Both creditors and stockholders may be given securities having
attributes other than those they originally possessed, in an enterprise
capitalized differently from that they originally entered. Their personal
dictates may differ from the judgment of the court, and they should be
accorded a more forceful weapon to achieve their desires-whether they
want liquidation, a more acceptable plan of reorganization or continua-
tion of the corporation as presently constituted. The freedom of an indi-
vidual to select the form of his investment and the enterprise in which
he will entrust his property is normally highly regarded in our society.
Before resort is made to compulsion, it should first be ascertained whether
satisfying the participants would subvert the interests of a larger group, and
if so, how great an injury would result from disregarding the dissenters'
wishes.
Congress chose to give participants who may be injured a forceful
position and incorporated a voting provision in chapter X to accomplish
this objective. Briefly stated, the procedure is as follows. After the judge
10. 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 571 (1952) (§ 171).
11. 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1952) (§ 174).
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has approved a proposed plan as "fair, equitable, and feasible," a copy is
submitted to the creditors and stockholders for acceptance or rejection
by them in writing.' 2 Acceptance is achieved by a vote of two-thirds in
amount of the claims filed and allowed of each class of participating cred-
itors, and, if the debtor has not been found insolvent, by a majority of
each class of stockholders. 13 The voting privilege is not without limita-
tion, however. In computing the required acceptances, the court may
exclude the vote of any creditor or stockholder, or class of them, not
affected by the plan,' 4 or whose claims or stock are disqualified as not
being voted in good faith,- or for whom payment or protection has been
otherwise provided.16 These limitations reflect a legislative judgment
that the public interest is promoted by effectuating reorganizations and
that certain claimants may be deprived of their vote in the interest of
the public and other participants. Provision is also made for the altera-
tion and modification of the plan even after its acceptance." In such case,
after the judge, pursuant to a hearing, approves the proposed change,
though he finds that it materially and adversely affects the interests of
creditors or stockholders, any party who has previously accepted the plan
will be deemed to have accepted it as altered or modified unless he files
a timely written rejection.'8  Once the judge confirms the plan as fair,
equitable and feasible,' 9 and substantial consummation takes place,20 the
plan may no longer be altered or modified if to do so would thereby
materially and adversely affect the interests of participants.
2'
Constitutional Safeguards
In construing the voting provisions of chapter X, the conflicting inter-
ests must be balanced by the courts with a view to this legislative deter-
mination. Another factor that requires consideration is the extent to which
the Constitution may limit congressional power to affect claimants' interests
if they are not provided the safeguard of a vote. This question will have
added significance if an adverse economic climate impels Congress to give
greater weight to the public's interest in accomplishing reorganizations by
eliminating entirely a vote of participants.
12. 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 575 (1952) (§ 175). The creditors and stock-
holders also receive "the opinion of the judge, if any, approving the plan...; the re-
port, if any, filed in the proceedings by the Securities and Exchange Commission...;
and such other matters as the judge may deem necessary or desirable for the informa-
tion of creditors and stockholders."
13. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952) (§ 179).
14. 52 STAT. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1952) (§ 107).
15. 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 603 (1952) (§ 203).
16. 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 616 (7), (8) (1952) (§§ 216 (7), (8)).
17. 52 STAT. 898 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 622 (1952) (§ 222).
18. 52 STAT. 898 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 623 (1952) (§ 223).
19. 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1952) (§ 221).
20. 66 STAT. 431 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 629(a) (1952) (§ 229(a)).
21. 66 STAT. 431 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 629(c) (1952) (§229(c)).
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Even though the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution has been
interpreted to empower Congress to legislate in regard to corporate reorgan-
izations, 22 the exercise of this substantive power is subject to the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.3 Accordingly, legislation may
neither be arbitrary nor capricious, and must grant participants reasonable
protection for their property.24 In determining whether creditors and
stockholders are constitutionally entitled to a vote, it is necessary to ex-
amine the protection available to them from any other existing or potential
safeguards.
Of greatest importance in this regard is the requirement that the
court, pursuant to a full hearing for which timely notice must be given,
affirmatively find the plan "fair and equitable," both before it is submitted
to participants for approval 25 and again, upon their acceptance, prior to
final confirmation.2 6  The statute does not define "fair and equitable," but
the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress intended to give to that phrase
its prior meaning in equity receivership practice.27  "Fair and equitable"
is therefore said to incorporate the doctrine of "absolute priority" 28
whereby no interest can share in a reorganization until every senior inter-
est receives in cash or new securities the "equitable equivalent" of its full
claim. If the holder of a junior interest contributes new value in property
or cash necessary to the corporation, his participation to the extent of such
contribution is not precluded.2 9 Although there is some question as to how
closely the courts have observed the letter of this doctrine, 30 "absolute prior-
ity" theoretically grants a claimant, in the relative order of his preference,
full protection for the principal of his claim, for any interest accumulated
thereon and for any loss of status due to the reorganization plan, to the
extent that a capitalization of prospective earnings indicates that he has
an existing claim against the corporation.3 1 The court thus protects the
value of a party's interest from majorities who, for expediency, may be
willing to have the class surrender part of its claim. Additional protection
is afforded by the requirement that the court find the reorganization plan
22. See Matter of Prima Co., 88 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Grand Boulevard Inv.
Co. v. Strauss, 78 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1935). Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.. 294 U.S. 648 (1935), although dealing with railroad
reorganizations, settled the issue.
23. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
24. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 89 F.2d 333 (5th
Cir. 1937); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1935).
25. 52 STAT. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1952) (§ 174).
26. 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1952) (§ 221(2)).
27. See SEC STUDY 142-43.
28. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1939).
29. Id. at 122; see Gilchrist, "Fair and Equitable" Plan of Reorganization: A
Clearer Concept, 26 CORxmSL L.Q. 592, 612 (1941).
30. See excellent discussion in Note, Absolute Priority Under Chapter X-A Rule
of Law or a Familiar Quotation?, 52 COLUm. L. Rzv. 900 (1952).
31. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525 (1941);
In re Inland Gas Corp., 211 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1954).
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"feasible." Since this finding is drawn from an inquiry into the economic
soundness of the proposed financial structure,8 2 the court thereby protects
claimants from unwarranted action by those who may be uninformed as to
the advisability of alternative capital structures.
In determining the fairness and soundness of a proposed plan, the
court is aided by the advice of the SEC.m  Also, aside from judicial
scrutiny, the act provides for administration of the reorganization by an
independent trustee who, presumably, will be able to balance and protect
the interests of all participants.
A participant's rights would certainly be adequately safeguarded, in
the "due process" sense, by the aforementioned provisions if the chief
protector, the judge, with the assistance of the SEC, were able to perform
the onerous task given him. Reorganization plans represent a delicate
balancing between the various claimants which is not easy to achieve.35
For example, when a holder of a $1,000 57o first mortgage bond is given
in exchange a $700 47o debenture, a $300 5% income bond, a $200 6%
preferred stock and five shares of common stock, has he received his "equi-
table equivalent"? Or has he received more than he is entitled to and
thus left a junior claimant with less than his fair share? Can a judge,
even with the advice of the SEC, decide in such a highly specialized and
complex matter whether the parties have been fairly treated? Would it not
be better to require the endorsement of a specified number of those who
are in fact vitally concerned with the subsequent operation of the firm?
In similar legislation regarding railroad reorganizations, where ac-
ceptance by two-thirds of each class of creditors is also required, Congress
has provided that a court may confirm a plan notwithstanding failure to
obtain such acceptance if the court finds, among other things, that the
creditors' rejection of the plan is not "reasonably justified." 36 The
Supreme Court has indicated that this provision does not deny procedural
due process, since full hearings are specified before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and the lower court, with judicial review by the appel-
late courts.8 7 This procedure was justified as no more arbitrary in the
constitutional sense than a provision requiring a sale in a depressed
market.38
32. SEC STUDY 159-61; see Calkins, Feasibility in Plans of Corporate Reorgani-
zations Under Chapter X, 61 HARv. L. Rv. 763 (1948).
33. 52 STAT. 890, 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 572, 608 (1952) (§§ 172, 208). See
Frank Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Col-
mission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rzv. 317, 319 (1941).
34. 52 STAT. 888, 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 556, 567 (1952) (§§ 156, 167).
35. See Frank, stpra note 33, at 321-22.
36. 49 STAT. 1969 (1936), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1952).
37. RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 532 n.35, 533 (1946).
38. Id. at 509, 533. Even the dissent indicates only that Congress did not intend
"to restrict the right of self-protection which it gave to railroad creditors," not that
Congress could not have done so if it were desired. Id. at 548-49.
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Similar reasoning would appear to sustain the constitutionality of a
reorganization procedure which did not have the requirement of a vote.
Although corporate reorganizations generally are not affected with
the same degree of public interest as exists in the case of railroads, and
participation by the SEC is merely advisory in the former whereas the
ICC is charged with approving a plan in railroad reorganizations,39 it is
unlikely that these distinctions would be employed to hold chapter X uncon-
stitutional in the absence of the voting provisions. The other surrounding
safeguards appear sufficient. However, should Congress reconsider chap-
ter X, the complexity involved in reallocating securities and the dimension
of the participants' interests at stake make it desirable as a matter of
policy that the participants continue to have a deciding voice on proposed
plans.
DETERMINATION OF THE CLASSES AFFORDED A VOTE
Assuming the desirability of a vote by participants as an integral part
of any reorganization statute, the next consideration is whether the priv-
ilege should be extended to all the shareholders and creditors of the
debtor corporation or only to those whose relationship with the reorgan-
ized enterprise will be affected in some prescribed manner. Of pertinence
here is the value to the public and interested parties of reorganizing a sick
corporation. Granting a vote to a large group increases the possibility
of disagreement and ultimate rejection of the proposed plan, thus lessen-
ing prospects of effectuating reorganization. Voting provisions are in-
cluded essentially on the premise that the firm's capital structure and the
revamped interests therein should reflect the self-interest of claimants. To
the extent that the desirability of promoting reorganizations clashes with
this premise, prime emphasis should be given to the interests of the par-
ticipants, for the reasons previously discussed.40 This can be accomplished
by extending the voting privilege to all creditors and stockholders in the
debtor corporation except those whose relationship with the debtor is ter-
minated or unaltered by the proposed reorganization plari. Denying a vote
to the latter classes, in order to promote reorganizations more effectively, is
not inequitable in view of such claimants' tenuous interest or unchanged
risk in the debtor.
The Need for Protection: A Functional Approach
Foremost among the classes not needing the protection of a vote are
those not given an interest in the reorganized firm because there are no
assets available for their claims after senior claimants are satisfied. As a
practical matter, granting a vote to one whose claim is valueless would
39. After a plan is filed with the Commission and hearings are held, it shall ap-
prove a plan, which may be different from any proposed, or it may refuse to approve
any plan. "No plan shall be approved or confirmed by the judge . .. unless the plan
shall first have been approved by the Commission and certified to the court." 47 STAT.
1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1952).
40. See p. 694 supra.
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impede reorganization, if not render it impossible, for no claimant is
likely to accept voluntarily a plan extinguishing his claim. It might be
contended, however, that a valueless class should have the power to ex-
press preference for available alternatives which could be more favorable
to it, such as an effort by the debtor corporation to accumulate further
assets under the existing capital structure or a different reorganization
value for the debtor which might increase the possibilities of the class'
participation. But senior claimants will probably prefer liquidation to
continuation of the firm as presently unsoundly capitalized, in which case
the sole achievement of the valueless class' vote would be the defeat of
a reorganization that might have benefited other claimants. As to the
other alternative, if revaluation could give recognition to its claims
the class would have a distinct interest in blocking a reorganization that
granted it no participation. While the class could challenge the pro-
posed plan as not "fair and equitable," the range within which a plan may
be "fair and equitable" makes difficult the task of overcoming the risk of
non-persuasion, so that without a vote the class may be unable to have its
demands satisfied.41 However, enabling the class to prevent reorganization
seems too high a price to pay merely to protect some possible modicum of
value for a group which, as to the plan being voted upon, has been judi-
cially determined to be valueless.
Even though a proposed plan recognizes that the claim of a class has
value, if the proposal relieves the class of its future dependence on
the revamped firm the interest of the class in the capital structure and allo-
cation of securities is not sufficient to award it a vote. For example, when
the face value of a class' claim is satisfied by a cash payment there is no
reason to accord it a voice in determining the new corporate structure,
since the members will not be affected by the firm's future operation.
Some members of the class may be reluctant to receive a cash payment
if their investment was on more favorable terms than they may now obtain
elsewhere. If a cash payment would compensate the participants for their
favorable investment, they would have little reluctance for such a payment.
In any event the appropriate forum for such an objection is the court,
before which the amount of the payment may be challenged as denying
the class the equitable equivalent of its prior claim. The additional protec-
tion of the vote is not needed, for the complex problems existing when a
non-cash provision is made for a claim are absent .here, and a judicial de-
termination of value is considered adequate in most equity proceedings.
Moreover, when a corporation needs reorganizing, many classes will be
forced to make some sacrifices to attain the desired corporate structure.
As a result, it is probable that a class receiving a cash payment will be
satisfied so that solicitation of its vote would merely result in unnecessary
41. Particularly since appellate review will be based only upon whether or not
there is evidentiary support to sustain the judge's findings on valuation. See, e.g., In re
Chicago Rys., 160 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1947).
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added expense. Similarly, if the amount of the cash payment is to be de-
termined by a judicial sale of specific property, or by appraisal of the
claim where less than its face amount will be paid, no vote need be pro-
vided. Problems collateral to the valuation of such claims will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
42
Instead of terminating a claimant's interest by a cash payment, the
plan may transfer a creditor's claim to another firm together with property
sufficient to satisfy the debt. Here, too, the proposal frees the creditor
from any future dependence upon the capital structure of the corporation
being reorganized. Objections to depriving the claimant of an oppor-
tunity to protect himself by a vote from losses subsequent to the transfer
will also be considered in the following section.4
A vote should be afforded those claimants whose interest in the debtor
corporation is significantly altered by the reorganization plan. Presumably
among those most deserving a vote are claimants who will receive securi-
ties in the reorganized firm of a class different from that previously pos-
sessed, e.g., an equity status substituted for that of a creditor. In addi-
tion, where the nature of the security remains the same, if there is a
change in the covenants contained therein which materially modifies the
claimant's rights, such as a reduction in the interest rate on bonded indebt-
edness or elimination of the cumulative feature on preferred stock, the
security-holder seems entitled to a vote. Similarly, a vote seems appro-
priate for claimants whose interests are directly abridged by temporary
restrictions on their rights, such as exist when a plan provides that under
certain circumstances dividends will not be paid.
A more difficult problem arises where rights granted to other parties
tend to restrict a claimant's previous economic advantage although none of
the superior legal incidents of the latter's interest are disturbed. This
occurs, for example, when a bondholder retains a prior lien against
property sufficient to satisfy his claim, but additional property against
which he, together with junior creditors, could previously have en-
forced his claim has now been made subject to a lien in favor of other
claimants. Similarly, granting common stock to claimants previously
having none tends to dilute an original common shareholder's control over,
and dividend interest in, the revamped corporation. In cases of this type,
the extent and remoteness of the injury resulting from the bondholder's
loss of his "cushion" and the dilution of the common shareholder's interest
are insufficient to justify granting a vote as additional protection. These
classes will retain substantially what they had prior to reorganization and
the sacrifice they are being asked to make seems insignificant in light of
the value to the public of reorganization. Also, they are assured pro-
tection in being able to contest the plan as not "fair and equitable." There-
fore, they should not be given the power, by means of a vote, to interfere
42. See pp. 707-08 infra.
43. See pp. 706-07 infra.
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with reorganization, especially when other classes are willing to have their
claims altered.
An additional problem exists as to voting rights of a junior class whose
claim is not altered except for the fact that the participation it is granted
is less than the full value of its claim because of the proposed valuation of
senior claims. This situation raises questions similar to those involved
in treating the claims of a valueless class, and for the same reasons there
considered 44 it would seem that the class should not be afforded a vote.
The Present Statutory Treatment
Chapter X limits voting rights45 to parties whose interest is "materially
and adversely affected" 46 by a proposed plan, and specifically excludes
those whose vote is not exercised in good faith or who are adequately
protected in specified manners. This standard apparently was adopted
to prevent obstruction of a reorganization plan by parties not injured
thereby and to avoid the expense of conducting a vote of those who would
probably accept the plan or at least have no significant reason for rejecting
it. Construction of the terms "materially and adversely" has been left to
the courts, apparently because it was considered undesirable or imprac-
tical to fix any rigid definition.47 Unfortunately the terms have not as yet
acquired a specific meaning in reorganization law, since the courts have
not often encountered the problem, but to the extent that they have it
would seem that the approach outlined above has been substantially
followed.
Courts have always denied a vote when a claim is valueless because
the reorganization value 48 of the corporation is insufficient to satisfy the
party's claim after allocating the available assets among prior claimants.
This result is specifically required by the statute in the case of share-
holders in an insolvent corporation, 49 and it has also been reached by the
courts without hesitation when dealing with junior creditors.5 °
44. See pp. 698-99 supra.
45. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952) (§ 179).
46. 52 STAT. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1952) (§ 107): "Creditors or stock-
holders or any class thereof shall be deemed to be 'affected' by a plan only if their
or its interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby."
47. See SEC STUDY 130 n.174.
48. The valuation of an enterprise for purposes of reorganization is arrived at by
a capitalization of its prospective earnings. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du-
Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). This proceeds from the theory that the value of a firm's
assets reflects their utility measured in terms of the earnings their use will generate,
capitalized at a rate of return commensurate to the risk attributable to the investment
in question. 1 D4WING, FINANCIAL POLICY O1V COl'ORATlONs 276 (5th ed. 1953).
49. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952) (§ 179). Junior stockholders
are denied a vote even in a solvent corporation if the assets are only sufficient to sat-
isfy the claims of creditors and preferred shareholders. See, e.g., In re Utilities Power
& Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ; It re National Food Products Corp.,
23 F. Supp. 979 (D. Md. 1938).
50. In the Matter of 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936) ; It re
Chicago Rys., 160 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1947); Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Ill.
Glass Co., 91 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1937) (alternative holding) ; O'Connor v. Mills, 90
F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1937).
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Courts have also denied a vote when a claimant is provided for in
a manner which leaves him without dependence on the future capital
structure of the enterprise. This result has uniformly been achieved when
provision is made for the discharge of a claim by a cash payment in full.51
Section 77B previously provided that a vote would be denied in such a
situation, but this provision was dropped in chapter X as stating the
obvious.6
2
Furthermore, a vote will be denied when the plan provides for pay-
ment of the claim at a value determined by appraisal53 or in an amount
derived through a judicial sale of property at a fair upset price,54 or when
a secured creditor's claim is satisfied by transfer of the property subject
to such claiim. 5  These methods are expressly recognized by the act as
protecting a dissenting class sufficiently to disregard its objections. It
is, therefore, not surprising that Congress also declared a vote unnecessary
for those claimants when such a provision is made for them as part of
the original plan.57 It may be argued that such parties should be given
a vote when the plan is initially presented to them, since a showing of
their displeasure could sponsor an alternative plan that would satisfy all
participants; a dissenting class might still be compelled to accept such pro-
vision if the court has considered it unwise to change the plan. Notwith-
standing the value of this alternative, the claimants' opportunity to present
their arguments at a judicial hearing on the issue of whether the plan is
"fair and equitable" seems adequate, and the additional protection of the
vote, with the added expense it necessitates, seems unwarranted.
The main problems arise when claimants receive a share in the re-
organized enterprise different in some respect from what they originally
possessed. The basic difficulty is in determining the degree of substantiality
and immediacy of injury which must be demonstrated before the courts
will deem an interest "materially and adversely" affected.
Courts have never denied a vote when claimants are granted securities
of a different class from that previously possessed -s or when there are
51. See, e.g., Knight v. Wertheim & Co., 158 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1946).
52. 6 COLLIR 3478.
53. E.g., National City Bank v. O'Connell, 155 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1946).
54. E.g., Country Life Apartments, Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944).
This is a drastic example, for it actually effected a liquidation of the enterprise, as all
classes of claimants were paid from the proceeds.
55. E.g., In re Englander Spring Bed Co., 17 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd men.,
86 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1936).
56. 52 STAT. 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7), (8) (1952) (§§ 216(7), (8)).
57. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952) (§ 179).
58. E.g., In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1939).
The act clearly indicates that the substitution of new securities would be a common
provision of a reorganization plan. A plan "shall include in respect to creditors gen-
erally or some class of them, secured or unsecured, and may include in respect to
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basic changes in the covenants of securities retained.59 Similarly, it has
been held that even the temporary abridgment of the rights of a class is
sufficient to afford the class a vote.60 When the effect on the claimant's
interests is indirect, as in instances previously discussed of diminution of a
security holder's "cushion" or dilution of a common shareholder's voting
interest, no case reveals that the claimant has been afforded a vote. In the
former instance, this result is specifically authorized by a statutory denial
of the vote, representing a legislative determination that adequate protec-
tion of such an interest exists without a vote.61 Even absent a specific
statutory provision, it would seem that a vote should be denied at the
point where the proposed plan allots to a class substantially what it had
prior to reorganization, i.e., the alteration of its existing claim will affect
the class only remotely. That an alteration might be so negligible as not
to be "material" is clearly contemplated by the statute. As a practical
matter, however, it would seem that if the claims of a class are such that
adjustments are needed in order to provide a workable capital structure,
the changes will probably be of a material nature.
A correlative problem is raised by the statutory requirement that an
interest be "adversely" affected before the claimant is afforded a vote.
This could be read as denying a vote whenever, in the court's opinion, the
overall effect of the plan is not adverse to the claimant's interest, i.e., the
claimant is to receive the equivalent of his claim in the revamped firm.
Under the absolute priority rule this construction would deny a vote to
every senior claimant, for he is entitled to the full value of his claim before
junior interests can participate. One court did deny a class a vote on the
modifications of a plan, on the ground that the proposed changes were
on the whole beneficial to the class, although some obvious disadvantages
were present.62  A contrary result was reached by another court which
stockholders generally or some class of them, provisions altering or modifying their
rights, either through the issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise.
." 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (1952) (§ 216(1)).
59. E.g., Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941) ; In re Chain Inv. Co.,
102 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1939).
60. See In re National Lock Co., 9 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1934). But one court
denied a vote to common shareholders although the plan contained provisions whereby
no dividends could be paid until the indebtedness was reduced to a certain sum and
whereby the bondholders were allowed representation on the board of directors. The
shareholders had obviously lost much of their previous ability to control the affairs of
the corporation, a right which is fundamental in an equity investment. However, this
case is not a strong precedent, for the common shareholders did not object and the
court did not specifically deal with the issue. In re Anchor Post Fence Co., 14 F. Supp.
801 (D. Md. 1936).
61. 52 STAT. 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (a) (1952) (§ 216(7) (a)).
62. it re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935). The plan originally provided
for a free grant to the financer of the reorganization of 15,000 shares of the common
stock and a five-year option to buy 100,000 shares at $10. It was changed to grant him
25,000 free shares and an option to buy 50,000 shares at $6.66 within five days of the
end of the period within which shareholders could subscribe. Though the reduction of
the option in time and number of shares might prove beneficial in the long run, the
immediate loss of 10,000 shares and the possible loss of nearly $3.50 a share in the
option seem of dubious benefit.
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held that judicial inquiry should end whenever substantial disadvantages
are perceived, regardless of possible beneficial aspects of the whole plan.6
If the voting privileges provided by Congress are not to be construed out
of existence, the latter view is clearly preferable.
TREATMENT OF A DISSENTING CLASS
Should one or more classes fail to accept the reorganization plan as
approved by the court, another plan may be formulated, presented for the
court's approval and again offered to participants entitled thereunder to
vote. This, of course, would entail a lapse of time, plus the additional
expense of holding hearings and gathering votes. Also, it may be difficult
to procure once more the acceptance of those who had previously agreed
to the plan, since they may feel that the alterations and probable improve-
ments in the provision for the dissenting classes were at their expense.
Should submission of another plan appear to be useless, reorganization
will not be achieved, unless there is some provision for compelling con-
formance by a dissenting class. There are two feasible methods for ob-
taining conformance: (1) permitting the court to overrule the wishes of
the dissenting class, or (2) providing for the dissenters in a manner that
would only slightly affect their interests so that their assent would not
be required.
The Alternatives
The first method gives primary emphasis to facilitating reorganiza-
tion. The court would be permitted to confirm any "fair and equitable"
plan, notwithstanding dissenting classes, either at its own discretion or, as
in railroad reorganizations, whenever it finds after a full hearing that
rejection is not "reasonably justified." 64 Railroads, however, present a
special situation to justify such a provision-public interest demands that
rail service be uninterrupted by financial distress. Our concept of eco-
nomic freedom normally involves permitting an individual to select the
investment of his choice, in a firm whose capital structure he is willing to
accept. In corporate reorganizations, the very reasons that require a vote
initially make it desirable to give more consideration to the participants'
preferences, especially where an expert administrative body assumes only
an advisory role.
More consonant with this approach is the second method, compelling
participation of dissenting classes in the plan only in circumstances which
negate or limit the possibility of their being injured. Two such circum-
stances may be specified. The first is where the plan retains the dissent-
ing class in the reorganized corporation, leaving it to risk the success of the
new capital structure. Logically, this should be done only if the class
63. In re National Lock Co., 9 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
64. See text and citation at note 36 supra.
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retains substantially what it had prior to reorganization and thus is not
"materially and adversely" affected by the recapitalization.6 5
A second circumstance justifying compulsory participation is where
the claimant's interest in the corporation is terminated, as by a transfer
of the property which secures the dissenting creditor's claim, subject to
such claim, or by a cash payment for the value of his claim. Cash payments
raise the troublesome question of the proper valuation of the claim in-
volved. Some authorities have considered that a dissenting class, having
once refused to participate in a "fair and equitable" plan, could properly
be given the liquidation value of its claim.60 This presupposes that a
"fair and equitable" plan could establish one valuation for claims of
assenting classes and another for those of dissenting classes. Since
liquidation value for some claimants could be less than the reorganization
value of their claims, using the former value in paying off dissenters would
tend to force such a class to approve an undesired plan rather than chance
receiving a lesser sum for its claims. On the other hand, using reorganiza-
tion value when the dissenter's claim is to be satisfied by a cash payment
makes such an alternative more advantageous than remaining in the cor-
poration, since the projected value is received without risk. As a result,
this prospect may create an incentive for the claimant to reject the plan.
However, it is unlikely that the claimant would reject a plan merely in the
expectation of receiving a cash payment, since he is not assured of a cash
payment and he may dislike the alternatives thereto. A new plan may be
proposed granting him an interest in the revamped firm which he may not
refuse if it does not "materially and adversely" affect him. On the other
hand, his rejection may render reorganization impossible so that the debtor
may have to be liquidated. The existence of such alternatives tends to
reduce the likelihood that the possibility of a cash payment will be a real
incentive to reject the plan. Therefore, adequate protection of the claim-
ant's interest dictates that his claim be valued as it would be if he remained
in the reorganized corporation. 67
Compulsory Participation Under Chapter X
The solution adopted by chapter X is that of prescribing specific
proposals which a class can be compelled to accept if these proposals are
either originally included in the reorganization plan or later offered in lieu
65. See pp. 702-03 supra. An alternate solution might permit some classes to be
considered "materially and adversely affected" for the purpose of expressing an initial
preference, but nevertheless subject to having the provision of the plan forced upon
it in the event it fails to accept and the judge finds that there is no other comparable
plan. This alternative would not be a substitution of judicial discretion for that of the
interested parties, but merely enforcement of an originally legislative determination
of the specific circumstances in which the slight possibility of injury to dissenting
classes does not counterbalance the need for reorganization.
66. See Gerdes, General Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorganization, 89 U.
PA. L. Rrv. 39, 52-53 (1940).
67. See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 19 VA. L. Riv. 698, 716-18 (1933).
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of a rejected proposal. Section 216(7) states that a dissenting class of
creditors shall be provided "adequate protection for the realization . . .
of the value of their claims" by:
"(a) . . . the transfer or sale, or by the retention by the
debtor, of such property subjected to such claims; or
(b) by a sale of such property free of such claims, at not less
than a fair upset price, and the transfer of such claims to the
proceeds of such sale; or
(c) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such
claims; or
(d) by such method as will, under and consistent with the
circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly pro-
vide such protection."68
Methods identical to (b), (c) and (d) are specified in subsection 216(8)
for providing stockholders "adequate protection for the realization .
of the value of their equity, if any." 69
Preserving the Claim and Collateral
Generally, subsection 7 (a) adequately protects dissenting creditors,
since the full amount of the claim is preserved and reinforced by collateral. 70
Should the value of the security allocated to the class fail to cover its entire
claim, the balance of the claim would be classified as unsecured and the
claimants treated as general creditors to the extent of the unsecured
balance. 71 Thus, if the claim was previously secured, the claimants' posi-
tion in regard to their primary security is not altered.
However, their position may not be identical as to the unsecured
portion of their claims. When the property subjected to creditors' claims
is retained by the debtor, the cushion previously available to these creditors
in the form of "free assets" against which they might have satisfied their
claims had their primary security been insufficient may no longer be avail-
able. Previously unsecured creditors may have been given a security inter-
est in this property or it may have been used to satisfy other claims.
Similarly, when property is transferred subject to the creditors' claims,
the creditor loses his original right to proceed against the debtor for any
deficiency. One court has labeled this objection merely theoretical. 72  It
would seem, however, that when the value of the property barely matches
the claim, the injury that could result from possible changes in the value
68. 52 STAT. 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1952).
69. 52 STAT. 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(8) (1952).
70. See SEC STUDY 130.
71. 52 STAT. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1952) (§ 197).
72. Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar Co., 85 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir. 1936).
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of the security through depreciation or price fluctuations, especially in the
hands of a debtor who is not considered a good credit risk, should be
recognized as more than theoretical.
If such risks are present, the dissenting creditor can probably con-
test the proposal as not "fair and equitable" or as failing to grant him
"adequate protection for the realization . . . of the value" of his claim.7 3
Recognizing the emphasis placed on permitting interested persons to shape
the reorganization, a proper interpretation of chapter X would require
examination of the possible injury that could result to one who is forced
to accept the proposal. It would appear, however, that a creditor contest-
ing the use of subsection 7(a) should demonstrate that there is a likelihood,
rather than a mere possibility, of a loss; otherwise utilization of this pro-
vision to effectuate reorganization could be undermined.
As a practical matter, subsection 7 (a) has limited significance. The
debtor will probably be in need of all of its property and therefore unable
to transfer or sell it. At the same time, retention of the property subject to
an unaltered claim will accomplish little toward reduction of fixed charges
which may have created the need for reorganization in the first place.74
Payment Upon Judicial Sale or Appraisal
The judicial sale at a "fair upset price," now available only to protect
whole classes of dissenters, is a carry-over from equity receivership, where
it was used to protect dissenters within a class.75 This provision also is
of limited usefulness, since expenditure of the property or cash needed
to satisfy an entire class may render reorganization impracticable. Espe-
cially is it of doubtful utility in dealing with large claims, or with those of
senior creditors entitled by the "absolute priority" rule to complete com-
pensation before satisfaction of junior claims. 76 If the claims of the dissent-
ing class are small, either because they originally were so or because they
are junior claims whose reorganization value is less than face value, it is
possible that sufficient assets could be marshalled to satisfy the claims
without endangering the success of the revamped corporation.
71
73. Graham, Fair Reorganization Plans Under Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 8
BROOKLYN L. Racv. 137, 146 (1938) ; 6 Cou xza 3482. The "fair and equitable" argu-
ment could probably also be raised by senior creditors whose claims are altered if
junior claims are retained under § 7(a). See 6 CoLmaZR 3495; SEC STUDY 131.
74. See Note, Provisions for Non-Assenting Classes of Creditors in Bankruptcy
Reorganisations, 46 YALZ L.J. 116, 119 (1936).
75. See SEC STUDY 138.
76. Id. at 135-38.
77. This provision has also been used to effect a liquidation, with all claimants
being paid from the proceeds of the judicial sale. See, e.g., In re Chicago Rys., 160
F2d 59 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Country Life Apartments, Inc., v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2d
Cir. 1944). A similar result has been reached by the courts without mention of voting
rights under § 216(10), 52 STAT. 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(10) (1952): "A plan
of reorganization under this chapter-(10) ... may include . . . the sale of all or any
part of its property, either subject to or free from any lien, at not less than a fair up-
set price. . . ." See In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 994
(N.D. Ill. 1944).
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The appraisal method for satisfying dissenters was at one time alleged
to deny due process.78 The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the con-
stitutionality of a similar provision under section 75(s), 79 dealing with the
farmer-debtor, 80 and of the appraisal provision applicable to railroad re-
organizations. 81 Today, appraisal, subject to judicial approval and review,
is considered no more arbitrary or lacking in procedural safeguards than
a judicial sale itself.8 It is, however, subject to the same practical limita-
tions as the judicial sale. As a result, resort has been made to this method
mainly when a class' claims have been appraised as worthless,8 and only
occasionally when the class has been paid the appraised value of its claims.84
"Equitable and Fair" Protection
The scope of the omnibus grant of subsection 7(d), and in the case
of stockholders subsection 8(c), is explicitly limited by the phrase "equit-
ably and fairly," which is interpreted to incorporate "absolute priority." 85
Hence, it cannot be used to scale down senior interests for the benefit of
junior claimants, although it seems certain that this would be true even
without an explicit provision.86 The broad language of this provision would
seem to enable a court to impose almost any plan on a dissenting class.
Unlike the first three provisions, it does not expressly require either that
the claimant's position remain substantially unchanged or that he be paid off.
The only significant limitation placed upon the use of this subsection is
the condition applicable to each of these methods, that there be provided
"adequate protection for the realization" of the participant's interest. If
emphasis is placed on "realization," the only proposals authorized by this
subsection are those that will provide complete compensation at the time
of reorganization. 87 Unless the term "realization" were given that con-
trolling meaning, theoretically it would be possible that under this provision
a court could obviate the requirement of a vote for any class, so long as the
plan was "fair and equitable"-a result obviously not intended by Con-
gress.
88
78. See it re Preble Corp., 12 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Me. 1935), aff'd sub nom. Preble
Corp. v. Wentworth, 84 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1936) (only on the ground that the plan
was not fair and equitable) ; In re Tennessee Publishing Co., 81 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.),
aff'd smb nor. Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 18 (1936)
(determination of the constitutionality issue held premature).
79: 49 STAT. 943 (1935), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1952).
80. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
81. See, e.g., RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
82. Id. at 509.
83. E.g., In the Matter of 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936);
In re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1938).
84. E.g., National City Bank v. O'Connell, 155 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1946).
85. SEC STUDY 134.
86. 6 COLLIR 3507. See text and citations at note 69 supra.
87. See Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F.2d 395
(5th Cir. 1936) ; It re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
88. See It re Granville & Winthrop Bldg. Corp., 87 F.2d 101, 103 (7th Cir. 1936).
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The sole occasion on which a court has employed this subsection was
a case in which the reorganization plan provided for full payment of the
claims of mortgage bondholders, with the reservation that the court would
later determine set-offs and defenses to the payment. The appraisal
provision was relied on as authority for this proposal. The court in-
dicated that if the appraisal provision was not wholly applicable, the pro-
posal in any event constituted adequate protection under subsection 7(d).S3
It is arguable that this omnibus provision may also be utilized to com-
pel members of a class to accept securities whose fair market value is equal
to the reorganization value of their claims. Since these claimants have
the privilege of disposing of the new securities, at which time they will
realize "complete compensation," they would seem to be adequately
protected. If there were a probability that the market value would equal
the reorganization value of their claims, there would be no objection to
this proposal. However, it is more likely that the market for securities
in the revamped corporation will be depressed, and thus the reorganization
value of the claims will exceed the securities' market value. Since market
value, by definition, will be unknown until the plan is effectuated and the
securities issued, extending this subsection to sanction such a proposal
would be erroneous. Furthermore, since virtually the only instance in
which a vote would be granted is when new securities are given to the
participants, use of the omnibus clause to foreclose a vote would be
improper.
Although there may be some circumstances where this provision
could be used to force dissenting classes to participate in a reorganization,9"
the courts will more likely resort to the omnibus provision only when there
is doubt as to the applicability of the other subsections. At best, therefore,
this provision will be used as alternative authority for approving hybrid
proposals which would probably be approved even if the clause were not
present. On the other hand, if its broad language were applied literally,
it is possible that the voting privilege so generously granted by section
17991 would be retracted. Elimination of the clause entirely would safe-
guard a proper application of the over-all statutory design.
As a general rule, the rehabilitation of a debtor corporation so that
its future operations may be successful requires material changes in the
interests possessed by participants. Congress has elected to defer in large
measure to the preference of participants with regard to the plan of
reorganization and to force participation only under circumstances in
which a party's interests are not materially affected. The result is that
the specific provisions compelling participation are operative in only a
limited number of practical situations. Unless economic conditions require
89. National City Bank v. O'Connell, 155 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1946).
90. See 6 CoLLIm 3507.
91. 52 STAT. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1952).
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more and swifter reorganizations, the narrow range of applicability of the
present provisions seems justified by the desirability of granting participants
a significant voice in determining the reorganization scheme.
DISQUALIFICATION OF THE VOTE: THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
The preceding discussion has revealed the power that can be exerted
by the vote, either in binding minority dissenters within a class when the
required plurality accepts a plan, or in upsetting the proposed plan when
rejecting it in an effort to block reorganization or to force the plan's pro-
ponents to grant the class more favorable treatment. Such power is granted
in the belief that participants, voting in their own self-interest, will at
the same time promote the best interests of their class. When a claimant
has an ulterior motive in considering a given proposal, so that his vote would
not reflect solely the protection of his own and his class' interest in the
corporation, some limitation should be placed on the power accorded to
him. The most rational solution is simply to disqualify such votes, permit-
ting only those of properly motivated participants to govern.
92
In demarcating improper motives, a problem arises when a party is a
member of more than one class. To the extent that his action with regard
to the proposal for one class may reflect his evaluation of the provisions
made for his other holdings, his vote in at least one class will not be mo-
tivated solely by his interests as a member of that class. There would,
however, be much practical difficulty in attempting to force an individual
to examine his holdings with great impartiality and vote differently as a
member of each class. One alternative is to deny a vote to any claimant
who has an interest in more than one class, but while this may assure
that votes reflect only the interests of each respective class, it hardly seems
equitable in view of the significant interests which the voting right is de-
signed to protect. It would, therefore, be more appropriate to permit every
claimant to express his preference on the basis of the totality of his in-
terest in the debtor. A more serious conflict exists where a party has
some interest, apart from that of a mere participant in the debtor cor-
poration, which he may be tempted to serve by exercise of his voting
power. Since the implementation of his preference may be incompatible
with the interests of his class and the corporation, disqualification appears
proper.
In any event, the fact that an interest was purchased immediately before
or even during reorganization proceedings suggests a need for closer scrutiny
92. An alternative would be for the court to tally the votes improperly motivated
but to reverse the preference expressed thereby. This solution cannot merit serious
consideration, for it must be premised on the assumption that a proper motive would
have resulted in an opposite vote, an assumption having no basis in fact. Moreover, this
procedure could lead to a result disagreeable to the requisite plurality of the class, com-
puted either with the disputed votes as cast or with such votes disqualified. A similar
solution was rejected in In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945). The
court there held that the affirmative votes of interest purchased in bad faith would be
disqualified, but the prior negative votes would not be reinstated.
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of the participant's motives. The presence of this factor alone should not
be conclusive, since such acquisition might be motivated by a voter's desire
to protect his other holdings in the corporation or a similar proper purpose.
In addition, to prevent a recently purchased interest from voting could
result in freezing all holdings in the debtor corporation, since few purchasers
may be willing to leave the fate of their investment in the judgment of
others. Thus restricting the alienability of such interests without additional
evidence that the purchaser was improperly motivated seems undesirable.
Similarly, any rule which would disqualify a party's vote merely because he
acquired his interest for an abnormally high or low price would also seem
to restrict improperly the alienability of claims. The amount a purchaser
will pay would seem to be evidentiary more of the degree of his desire than
of the impropriety of his motive. The payment of an abnormal price
should therefore be considered as only an additional factor in the determina-
tion of good faith.
The present statute provides that in determining whether a plan has
been accepted, the judge may, after hearing upon notice, disqualify those
votes not cast in good faith, in light of or irrespective of the time of
acquisition.9 3 This provision has enabled the courts to cope with situations
with which they had not been authorized to deal under section 77B. Under
the previous statute, judicial review of disqualifying circumstances was
restricted mainly to instances where an interest was purchased under
circumstances amounting to fraud or violation of a fiduciary duty.94 In
such circumstances the court could either disqualify the vote entirely or
reduce it to represent only the amount actually paid for the interest.
However, the language of section 77B forced the courts to limit investigation
to votes cast in favor of the plan.95 The House hearings show that the
present provision was intended to prevent attempts of participants "by
the use of obstructive tactics and of hold-up techniques to exact for them-
selves undue advantages" 98 or "some particular preferential treatment,
such as the management of the company." 9
7
As was to be expected, the "good faith" section has not been used to
disqualify a voter merely because he has more than one holding in the
corporation. Although in two cases the argument was made that the
acceptance of a plan by senior claimants was colored by its benefit to their
added junior interest, in neither case were the votes disqualified. 98
93. 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 603 (1952) (§ 203).
94. 6 COLLImR 2880.
95. See, e.g., Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F.2d
395, 400 (5th Cir. 1936).
96. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House on H.R. 6439,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 180 (1937). See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204,
211-12 (1945).
97. Hearings, supra note 96, at 182.
98. First Nat'l Bank v. Poland Union, 109 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1940) (plan held not
to be "fair and equitable"); In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F2d 22, 26 (2d
Cir. 1939) (plan confirmed as "fair and equitable").
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This section has been invoked almost exclusively in situations where
the claim or stock in issue was purchased during reorganization proceedings.
However, since the act specifically states that the time of acquisition is only
a factor which may be considered and is not by itself a ground for dis-
qualification, the courts have required the presence of an ulterior motive,
that of advancing an interest other than the purchaser's legitimate stake in
the enterprise. 99 The scanty case law reveals no instance in which such
an ulterior motive was discovered, although in one case the court did
disqualify certain votes. There, the dubious explanation was that the
price paid by the purchaser discriminated in favor of the sellers, since
they received more than the amount which was to be allocated under the
plan to participants of a similar class. ° ° Another court recognized that
payment of an excessive price does not establish the existence of an ulterior
motive, since a high price might result equally from an urgent desire to
protect one's legitimate interests as from a bad faith attempt to affect a
proposed reorganization plan.1'0
The mere presence of the "good faith" provision, if not its actual use in
appropriate cases, serves the useful function of balancing two objectives. It
offers a reasonable standard by which the power possessed by participants
through the exercise of their vote may be curbed for the well-being of the
debtor corporation and the remaining claimants. At the same time, it
preserves this power for those who will use it in the best interest of the
debtor corporation and their individual claim therein.
CONCLUSION
Although to date there has been a relative absence of litigation con-
cerning chapter X's voting provisions, this is readily explainable on several
grounds: (1) When claims are altered pursuant to a reorganization
plan, previously existing interests are, of necessity, normally "materially
and adversely" affected thereby. (2) Since the reorganized corporation
will almost always be in need of most of its assets, only rarely can the
"adequate protection" provisions be utilized to deny a vote or to compel
participation. (3) The operation of the "good faith" section is factually
limited to circumstances which do not occur frequently. (4) The voting
provisions, as enacted and interpreted, do not present difficult problems of
construction which might be conducive to litigation.
This scarcity of litigation does not signify that the voting provisions
have an unimportant role in the statutory reorganization scheme. As
has been demonstrated, they do grant to many participants additional
99. E.g., In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Regard-
less of motive, however, one court disqualified some acceptances which were obtained
through sub rosa dealings. In re Fuller Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 118 F.2d 978 (6th Cir.
1941).
100. In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
101. In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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protection without unduly obstructing the basic objective of effectuating
reorganizations. However, since the Constitution does not demand the
inclusion of the vote in a reorganization statute, at least so long as other
safeguards of the participants' interests are present, the existing deference
to the judgment of participants is not necessarily permanent. Future
changes in our socio-economic structure may dictate a shift to a statutory
scheme which would emphasize the role of the court or an administrative
body as the chief protector of the interests of participants and the public.
M.A.
